Myanmar’s military will no doubt win this month’s sham elections. But could a shake-up follow?
- Written by The Conversation
Myanmar’s military regime has announced elections will be held in three phases, starting on December 28 and concluding in January.
Two outcomes are certain: first, the military-aligned party will be recorded as winning and, second, the government in exile – the National Unity Government – will fade even further into the background.
In the close to five years since the military seized power in February 2021, the country has been engulfed in a civil war, with the military pitted against People’s Defence Forces and numerous ethnic armed organisations. Thousands of resistance protestors, fighters and politicians, including President Win Myint and the ever-popular leader Aung San Suu Kyi, remain imprisoned.
The military controls the levers of government and holds all the major population centres. But its brutal air, artillery and drone attacks have failed to crush the resistance. The resistance has captured large swathes of territory, restricting the upcoming elections to only 274 of the nation’s 330 townships (constituencies).
Inside and outside the country, the elections are seen as a sham. The military-stacked Union Election Commission has deregistered political parties for failing to meet criteria it has set, such as having a certain number of party members or offices. It has also dissolved Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy party.
The elections will be held in the context of a state-controlled media landscape in which criticism of them is prohibited under the newly-minted Law on the Prevention of Disruption and Sabotage of Multi-Party Democratic General Elections.
Citizens criticising the election on social media have been sentenced for up to seven years in prison with hard labour. For some offences, the death penalty applies.
The elections are an attempt to gain the legitimacy, at home and abroad, that currently eludes the military regime. They are designed to demonstrate authority and give an impression of effective control. By simulating compliance with international democratic norms, the regime hopes to promote a sense of normalcy, consolidate power and open the door to greater international engagement, all the while preserving the status quo.
The National Unity Government living in exile and a myriad of its international supporters are calling on the international community to not send election observers. Instead, they want the world to denounce the sham election.
ASEAN leaders are insisting that a cessation of violence and inclusive political dialogue precede elections. They have rebuffed an invitation to send observers.
The best the regime could hope for is that some individual ASEAN member states join Russia and Belarus in sending observers. However Thailand, the most ambivalent ASEAN member, which has argued the election should serve as a foundation for a sustainable peace process, is now saying it will be difficult for ASEAN re-engage with Myanmar. China is believed to be supportive of elections, but has not committed publicly to sending observers.
Continued Western ostracism won’t matter to the junta, for whom regional legitimacy is more important than either domestic or Western legitimacy.
Neighbouring countries are concerned about peace and stability on their borders, high levels of irregular migration, the impact of unregulated mining that pollutes rivers flowing through their countries, the flourishing production and trade in heroin and methamphetamine, and the proliferation of cyber scam centres enslaving and defrauding their citizens.
Citizens of these countries demand their governments address these issues, and the elections will make contact with the regime more defensible. It won’t be a case, as it was before, of competing views on whether engagement or isolation is the better way to bring about reform in Myanmar.
This time, there will be no delusions about reform. Rather, neighbours will be concerned with their national interest agenda, and will ride out any accusations of appeasement and complicity in atrocity crimes. After all, authoritarian elections and dealing with authoritarian regimes is not unusual in Southeast Asia.
It would be a mistake to see the elections in 2025–26 as a re-run of the 2010 elections. Those elections were held under the 2008 constitution, which ushered in a reformist government led by a former general.
The elections will not be a transition to civilian or parliamentary rule. Nor will they be an exit ramp for coup leader Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing. To ensure his own safety, he will want to remain in a role where the apparatus of the state will protect, not prosecute, him.
The elections will be a sham, but they will usher in changes to the military line-up. The current commander will no doubt become president and choose a compliant military officer as his replacement as commander-in-chief. The parliament will be dominated by the military and military-aligned parties.
In the immediate aftermath of the election, it will be hard to see any change in the fear and violence that are the tools of choice for regime survival.
However, under Myanmar’s tattered constitution, the military commander is not answerable to any civilian authority, even the president. Min Aung Hlaing’s replacement might at some point become his own man and favour a negotiated end to the conflict.
That is, the elections open the possibility of some diffusion of power. Although this seems unlikely now, it may be better to have this (albeit remote) possibility rather than no election and a continuation of the status quo – a brutal military dictatorship and relentless war of attrition.
The National Unity Government in exile needs to engage with the reality that elections will be held, bringing the junta greater regional engagement, rather than wishing for some imagined day of meaningful international support. Otherwise, it could fade even further into the background.
