Instead of a marriage, the Coalition should be an on-again, off-again affair

The short-lived split between the Nationals and the Liberal Party after last year’s election has been followed by another breakup less than nine months later.

The Nationals are publicly stating they cannot work under Sussan Ley’s leadership. Provided there’s no rekindling of the relationship, this is the end of a coalition arrangement that’s survived for more than a century, albeit with the occasional hiccup.

As dramatic as this seems, it’s not the first time it has happened. Earle Page resigned as leader of the (then) Country Party in 1939 because he could not work under Liberal prime minister Robert Menzies, leading to a temporary breakup.

Even earlier, the Country Party made it a condition of establishing the first Coalition that Prime Minister Billy Hughes be replaced by the Nationalist Party’s Stanley Bruce.

But this time, the Nationals are much weaker than they were in the past. Facing perceived political threats from One Nation and a revolving door of leaders in the past decade, the party may benefit from some time to regroup.

Access to power

The Country Party emerged as a rural counterweight to the perceived urban bias of the other political parties in the first quarter of the 20th century.

In a clear statement of independence, the Country Party’s first federal leader, William McWilliams told the parliament in March 1920 the party was not seeking any alliances or “collusion”. It would steer its own course.

This, however, did not last long. The Coalition has been a consistent feature of the political landscape since 1923.

The Country Party, which would go on to become the National Party, is Australia’s second oldest, after Labor. Because of the coalition arrangement, it has been in government more often than not over that period. As a result, the party has wielded policy power arguably out of proportion to the number of votes it attracts.

The Liberal National Party arrangement in Queensland aside, the Nationals have resisted calls for the parties to amalgamate. Both the Liberals and the Nationals have benefited from the coalition.

The Liberals have relied on National Party numbers on all but two occasions to form government. Meanwhile, the Nationals have gained access to key cabinet posts of importance to rural Australia, such as trade and commerce.

Particularly under John “Black Jack” McEwen – who had a brief prime ministerial stint in the 1960s – the party wielded real influence over Australia’s economic policy direction. For instance, he drove the negotiation of a trade agreement with Japan. More broadly, McEwen successfully pushed for tariff protection for Australia’s manufacturing industries.

Over the years, the Nationals have crossed the floor over tariff policy, the restructure of the Australian Wheat Board and other issues of direct concern to the party’s constituency.

Each time, these events have highlighted something that many tend to forget: the Coalition was never one party, but two distinctly different ones, with different constituencies and often different priorities.

History repeating

The events of this week are also not the first time the parties have disagreed while in opposition, with the Liberals supporting a Labor government bill and the Nationals voting against it.

In 1973, the Nationals opposed the Whitlam government’s Industries Assistance Commission Bill. They argued the commission (the predecessor to the Productivity Commission) would introduce central planning by stealth and “be usurping the functions of many government departments”.

But there’s an important difference. Between 1972 and 1974, the then Country Party and the Liberals were not in coalition. They did not re-form the Coalition after Labor won the 1972 election. In the interim, both parties were free to vote in parliament in line with their own policies.

Why stay together?

While coalition makes sense to form government, the persistence of the arrangement when in opposition is more perplexing.

The Liberal-National Party Coalition is a very peculiar beast. It’s unlike any coalition arrangement anywhere in the world. Elsewhere, minor parties come together only after an election and negotiate a way to form government.

The apparent permanence of the Australian arrangements has contributed to the current unedifying situation. There is no reason why two different political parties in opposition would agree with one another on everything and vote accordingly in parliament.

The crisis here is a direct result of the two parties, largely for historical reasons, persisting with an uncomfortable coalition that is not necessary while they are in opposition, as was demonstrated between 1972 and 1974.

And over the past four decades, the Nationals have faced a different Australia from the one in which McEwen was so influential. The deregulation of the economy in the 1980s and 1990s, which included reduced support for the agricultural sector, put the Nationals on the back foot in policy terms.

Read more: Nationals break Coalition, declaring it 'untenable' and blaming Ley

Rather than being the driver of pro-rural policies, they were defending Coalition policies their supporters disliked. Gun reforms introduced after the Port Arthur tragedy in 1996 is a case in point. Nationals leader Tim Fischer played a central role in supporting Liberal Prime Minister John Howard’s position.

It’s left the Nationals in a weaker electoral position over time. In the current parliament, Labor and the Liberals (including Liberal-aligned Liberal National Party members) each hold more rural seats than the Nationals. Ironically, given recent events, Tim Fischer’s old seat is now held by Ley.

There’s also the rural independents, making inroads into former National Party strongholds.

Depending on what recommendations are in the currently unpublished report into the Liberals’ performance at the 2025 election, the Nationals may find that this time, the Liberals will decide the coalition agreement is not worth the grief while in opposition.

A break would provide Sussan Ley and her team with the opportunity to reassess their party’s values and rebuild in a way that improves their chances of picking up the urban seats they so desperately need to form government. They may conclude this is easier to do without the Nationals.